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UNFIT FOR DUTY: THE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR BAR AS A
REMEDY FOR FRAUD
Renee M Jones*
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, scholars regarded the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as a model administrative agency.' Its haloed
reputation began to fade, however, as a series of catastrophes jolted the
corporate world at the turn of the 2 1st century. The Enron and
WorldCom scandals, the internet bubble collapse, the subprime
mortgage crisis, and Bernie Madoffs brazen and long-running Ponzi
scheme all revealed weaknesses within the agency that a high profile
enforcement agenda had helped to mask.
The SEC has drawn criticism not only for failing to detect or prevent
these catastrophic frauds, but also for its ineffective post-crisis response.
Much of this criticism focuses on the efforts of the agency's
enforcement division.2 Although the SEC's website boasts that it has
brought actions against 157 financial firms, including charges against 66
senior executives, and extracted more than $2.6 billion in penalties and
other forms of monetary relief,3 closer scrutiny reveals that no senior
executive of a failed or bailed out firm has personally paid penalties,
and no high-level executive has been charged with a crime.
* Professor, Boston College Law School. This Article was prepared for the Symposium on
Addressing the Challenges of Protecting the Public: Enforcement Practices and Policies in the Post-
Financial Crisis Era at the University of Cincinnati College of Law on March 15, 2013. The Article
benefited from comments from Jayne Barnard and Lyman Johnson and participants in the Boston
College Law School Summer Workshop. Thanks also to Andrew Miller for excellent research
assistance.
1. See, e.g., BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 62 (6th ed.
2006).
2. See Ross MacDonald, Note, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New SEC
Enforcement Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419, 435 (2012) (asserting that the Commission is "failing
miserably").
3. See SEC Enforcement Actions Addressing Misconduct that Led to or Arose from the
Financial Crisis, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlightlenf-actions-fc.shtml (last visited June 12, 2013).
4. Two exceptions to this assertion are discussed infra Part III.
5. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to
Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 868
(2013) (noting that the Justice Department has not criminally charged any of the key officers or
managers of the financial institutions deemed 'too big to fail'); see also James Ridgeway, How to Put
Wall Street CEOs in Prison, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 8, 2011, 1:59 PM), http://
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/03/how-put-wall-street-ceos-prison (quoting Charles Ferguson,
Oscar winning director of the documentary film "Inside Job": "Forgive me, I must start by pointing out
that three years after a horrific financial crisis caused by fraud, not a single financial executive has gone
to jail-and that's wrong.").
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The response of federal officials to the 2008 financial crisis contrasts
starkly with the approach after the 2001-2002 accounting scandals. In
that round, a number of top executives faced trial, and prosecutors won
convictions against Dennis Kozlowski, Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling,
and Bernard Ebbers, among others.6 Although the SEC dragnet spared
the directors of WorldCom and Enron, private plaintiffs pursuing
securities fraud claims extracted unprecedented personal payments from
outside directors of these firms.7
Much of the recent criticism of the SEC's enforcement efforts has
focused on its practice of allowing large financial firms (many of which
are repeat offenders) to settle SEC charges without admitting or denying
liability.! Of equal concern is the agency's failure to identify or punish
the individuals responsible for corporate misdeeds. A number of
problems stem from these routine SEC settlement practices.9 First,
critics argue that settling cases without identifying culpable individuals
deprives the public of information about who is responsible for the
collapse of the too-big-to-fail firms.' 0 Such opacity prevents institutions
and investors from protecting themselves against future financial harm."
Others worry that the lack of personal accountability renders the
securities laws ineffective in deterring fraud.12  From a retributive
perspective, the absence of personal penalties allows corporate officials
to avoid facing any consequence for their transgressions and deprives
the public of the opportunity to express disapproval of their conduct.3
Finally, many fear that the SEC's practice of settling cases without a full
accounting of responsibility undermines public confidence in
6. See Ramirez, supra note 5, at 884 & n.77.
7. See Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REv. 105, 155 (2006); Bernard Black et al.,
Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1129 (2006).
8. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (criticizing
the SEC's "long standing policy, hallowed by history but not by reason," of allowing defendants to
settle SEC charges without admitting liability); SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 CIV. 6829 (JSR),
10 Civ. 0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (questioning the propriety of the
proposed SEC settlement with Bank of America); Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of
Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement ofLaw, 82 U. CIN. L. REv. 504, 508-13 (2013).
9. See MacDonald, supra note 2, at 435.
10. Buell, supra note 8, at 513; Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335 ("[T]here is an overriding
public interest in knowing the truth.... [T]he SEC, of all agencies, has a duty, inherent in its statutory
mission, to see that the truth emerges; and if it fails to do so, this Court must not, in the name of
deference or convenience, grant judicial enforcement to the agency's contrivances.").
11. Buell, supra note 8, at 13.
12. MacDonald, supra note 2, at 444; Ramirez, supra note 5, at 921.
13. Ramirez, supra note 5, at 930; Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 943, 951-52 (1995) (discussing how the social meanings attached to various actions create
a framework of understanding within which individuals live).
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For these reasons, commentators have called on the SEC and the
Justice Department to bring more cases against the individuals who led
the failed financial firms to ruin. They worry that only a credible threat
of prison time or severe monetary sanctions can deter corporate
executives from excessive risk-taking and fraud. Although such
concerns are valid, this Article focuses on another enforcement tool that
has received less scholarly attention: the power to bar officers and
directors of public companies from future service in such roles.
The SEC has long had the power to obtain federal court orders
barring individuals who violate the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws from future service as officers or directors of public
companies. Although Congress recently expanded the agency's power
in this realm, the SEC seldom pursues bars against directors or senior
executives of large firms. This Article argues that if the SEC pursued
bars more regularly, it could better motivate executives and directors to
heed their obligations under the federal securities laws. Such a strategy
should also spur directors to perform more responsibly the enhanced
oversight duties imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.1 5
The proposal for increased use of the officer and director bar should
sidestep concerns expressed by some commentators about the fairness of
director liability schemes under corporate and securities laws. Some
scholars maintain that it is unfair to hold directors liable for accounting
frauds spearheaded by the managers they oversee.16  They claim the
mere prospect of such liability would deter capable directors from
serving. These concerns have prompted judges and legislators to erect
a veritable bulwark against director liability under state and federal
14. Buell, supra note 8, at 513; Luis Aguilar, SEC Commissioner, Taking a No-Nonsense
Approach to Enforcing the Federal Securities Laws, Remarks at Securities Enforcement Forum 2012
(Oct. 18, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/SpeechlDetail/Speech/1365171491510#_edn6
(citing statistics showing that "61% of investors have no confidence in government regulators"); see
generally Matt Taibbi, Why Isn't Wall Street In Jail?, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216 (asserting that "federal
regulators and prosecutors have let banks and finance companies that tried to bum the world economy to
the ground get off with carefully orchestrated settlements") [hereinafter Taibbi, Wall Street Jail]; Matt
Taibbi, Bank of America: Too Crooked to Fail, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/bank-of-america-too-crooked-to-fail-20120314.
15. This article builds on earlier work that addresses weaknesses in the enforcement system for
directors' fiduciary duties. See Renee M. Jones & Michelle Welsh, Toward a Public Enforcement
Model ofDirectors'Duties ofOversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 343, 343-44 (2012); Jones, supra
note 7, at 113-17.
16. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP.
L. 976, 982-85 (2009) (arguing for a high bar for director liability for risk management failures).
17. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 7, at 1140-41 (stating "a significantly higher level of risk
for outside directors could well deter good candidates from serving and make directors who do serve
excessively cautious and process-conscious").
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These standard arguments against director liability do not apply with
equal force to the proposed policy of removing culpable directors from
positions in which they might cause further harm to public investors.
Indeed, a common argument against director liability is that the fair and
natural consequence for director oversight failures is the loss of future
professional opportunities that stems from one's association with
corporate mismanagement or fraud.'9 However, anecdotal and empirical
data suggest that the purported reputational harm does not keep directors
from continuing to occupy fiduciary positions at public companies.20
Therefore, a policy that bars directors whose oversight failures lead to
catastrophic financial harm seems an appropriate means for ensuring the
natural consequences that market forces have failed to effect.2 1
This Article therefore argues that the SEC should more regularly seek
to bar senior executives and outside directors of corporations impacted
by fraud. It shows that astronomical corporate penalties and the remote
prospect of criminal prosecution have failed to deter corporate officials
from making reckless decisions or abiding fraud. After laying out the
case for the increased use of bar orders, the Article recommends
changes to the SEC's enforcement strategies that could help the agency
improve its success rate when seeking bar orders in court. The Article
proceeds as follows. Part II takes on traditional deterrence theory and
demonstrates that the threat of jail and ever increasing monetary
penalties have failed to deter corporate officials from committing fraud.
It then draws on criminal and psychological research to argue that
modest penalties commensurate with a defendant's degree of culpability
18. See Jones, supra note 7, at 115.
19. Black et al., supra note 7, at 1135.
20. For anecdotal accounts, see Former Enron Directors Then and Now, WASH. POST (June 6,
2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/01/AR2006060101852.html (reporting on former Enron directors who
continued to serve on other public company boards); Louis Lavelle, Enron Directors: Unfit to Serve
Anywhere?, BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2002-
02- ll/enron-directors-unfit-to-serve-anywhere (reporting on efforts by shareholder activists to unseat
former Enron directors from other corporate boards); Steven M. Davidoff, Despite Worries, Serving at
the Top Carries Little Risk, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2011), available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/despite-worries-serving-at-the-top-carries-little-risk (noting
that directors of failed financial firms continue to serve as directors of other public companies). For an
empirical investigation into the same matter, see Steven M. Davidoff et al., Do Outside Directors Face
Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial Crisis, HARv. Bus. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2200552
(concluding "[t]here does not appear to be a viable labor market for outside directors to sufficiently
motivate them to act in the way that regulators and perhaps shareholders may wish them to").
21. In a similar vein, Lyman Johnson recently recommended that Congress authorize bankruptcy
courts to debar "faithless fiduciaries" from occupying leadership positions in corporate organizations.
See Lyman Johnson, Debarring Faithless Corporate and Religious Fiduciaries in Bankruptcy, 19 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 523 (2011).
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would be more effective in encouraging compliance with law. Part III
outlines the existing law governing the SEC's power to impose officer
and director bars. It shows that, despite the agency's campaign for
expanded powers in this realm, it has been reluctant to seek bars against
directors and high-level executives of prominent firms. This Part
invokes the example of a lesser-known Enron fraud and the facts of the
financial crisis to show that director oversight failures have been a
contributing factor in many of the last decade's headline-grabbing
corporate disasters. Part IV lays out the case for broader utilization of
the officer and director bar. It argues that the SEC should investigate
director conduct in cases of significant corporate fraud or failure and
seek bars in instances of gross dereliction of duty. It also addresses
anticipated objections to this proposal.
II. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL PENALTIES To DETER FRAUD
The stock response from lawmakers to corporate and financial
scandals has been greater criminalization of corporate and securities
laws. After WorldCom and Enron, Congress created a slew of new
corporate crimes and increased criminal and civil penalties for fraud.22
Congress also expanded the SEC's enforcement powers and
significantly increased the agency's budget.2 3  The size of monetary
settlements in SEC enforcement actions grew significantly after
Sarbanes-Oxley, and continued to soar after the 2008 financial
collapse.24
For example, in a record-setting settlement, Bank of America paid
$150 million to settle allegations that it misled investors in disclosures
related to its acquisition of Merrill Lynch.25 Soon thereafter, Goldman
Sachs agreed to pay $550 million to settle claims brought over its flawed
disclosure in the Abacus CDO transactions.26 Finally, Citigroup agreed
to a $285 million settlement of SEC charges that it fraudulently pawned
off worthless mortgage backed securities on investors.27
22. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(and it Might Just Work), 36 CONN. L. REv 915, 969-77 (2003) (cataloging new criminal provisions).
23. See Cut Proposed for SEC Budget, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 2003 ("After accounting scandals at
Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc., Congress increased the SECs budget about 70% in fiscal year 2003.").
24. See Top Ten SEC Settlements, NERA Economic Consulting, Securities Litigation Trends,
available at http://www.securitieslitigationtrends.com/toplO.asp (reporting post Sarbanes-Oxley SEC
settlements ranging from $310 million to $800 million).
25. Louise Story, Judge Accepts SEC's Deal with Bank ofAmerica, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2010),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/business/23bank.html.
26. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 million to settle SEC Charges
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 17, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.
27. Press Release, SEC, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle SEC Charges for Misleading
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A. The Futility of Corporate Penalties
Despite these ever-escalating settlement amounts, the nation's largest
financial firms continued to distinguish themselves as serial re-
offenders. Even before 2008, firms such as Citigroup and Merrill Lynch
faced multiple fraud charges and paid huge sums to settle shareholder
and government suits related to their participation in the Enron and
WorldCom frauds, analyst conflicts of interest, and consumer and
mortgage abuses.28
The apparent futility of corporate level punishment has led many to
assert that large corporate fines are both ineffective and ill-conceived.29
These commentators point out that the costs of large settlements are
borne by corporations, their insurers, and ultimately the shareholders,
and therefore, do not directly impact the individuals who caused the
fraud.30 Moreover, the sanctioned firms are so wealthy that even a fine
running into the hundreds of millions of dollars is often viewed as a
mere cost of doing business.3 1
Although some commentators advocate for criminal charges against
these firms, the deterrent potential of corporate criminal penalties is
equally unavailing. From public comments, it appears that Justice
Department officials have determined that criminal charges against large
corporations are off the table due to fear of dire collateral consequences
and economic harm. 32  Instead of pursuing criminal charges against
Investors About CDO Company Profited From Proprietary Short Position Former Citigroup Employee
Sued for his Role in Transaction (Oct 19, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22134.htm. The District Court for the Southern District
of New York rejected the proposed settlement and ordered the parties to trial. SEC v. Citigroup Global
Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting settlement). Both parties appealed the
district court's decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed the order requiring
trial and heard the appeal on February 8, 2013, but has not rendered a decision on the merits of Judge
Rakoff's ruling. Peter Latmann, Appeals Court Hears Arguments on Judge's Rejection of SEC-
Citigroup Deal, DealBook, Feb. 18, 2013, available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/appeals-court-hears-arguments-over-judge-rakoffs-rejection-
of-citigroup-settlement/?_hptrue&_type=blogs&r=0.
28. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN L. REv 963, 999-1002 (2009) (cataloging
the banks' roles in the Enron and WorldCom fiascos).
29. MacDonald, supra note 2, at 423 ("[D]espite the evidence that [] fines have almost no
deterrent effect-the Commission's success in extracting even exorbitant fines has failed to prevent or
even curb a repeated pattern of financial abuse by a repeated group of abusers-the response from the
Commission and Congress has always been the same: more and higher fines.").
30. See Ralph Ferrara & Scott Fishwick, Mary Jo: SEC Enforcement? Go Back to the Future!,
SECURITIES LAW DAILY (BNA) (May 20, 2013).
31. Id. ("[C]orporations internalize [penalties] as a cost of doing business, and, in any event, the
cost is primarily bome by shareholders.").
32. As then-Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice's Criminal Division
Lanny Breuer told Frontline:
[lin any given case, I think I and prosecutors around the country, being responsible, should
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systemically important firms, the Justice Department has turned to
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, by which criminal charges are set
aside on the condition that the corporation comply with remedial
measures prescribed in the agreement.33  This new approach represents a
reaction to the impact of indicting former accounting giant Arthur
Andersen-a course commentators have described as a corporate "death
penalty." 34
B. The Deceptive Appeal ofIndividual Monetary Sanctions
Scholarly disillusionment with the effectiveness and appropriateness
of corporate-level penalties has led some to urge officials to focus their
enforcement zeal on the individuals responsible for corporate fraud.
After all, the theory goes, corporations do not commit fraud: only their
human agents do. To this end, some scholars recommend that regulators
require responsible individuals to disgorge ill-gotten gains and pay
monetary penalties from their own pockets.35  Still others call for
speak to regulators, should speak to experts, because if I bring a case against institution A, and
as a result of bringing that case there's some huge economic effect, it affects the economy so that
employees who had nothing to do with the wrongdoing of the company- . . .. If it creates a
ripple effect so that suddenly counterparties and other financial institutions or other companies
that had nothing to do with this are affected badly, it's a factor we need to know and
understand.... That doesn't mean we won't go forward, but it has to be a factor.
Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS television broadcast Nov. 30, 2012), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/lanny-
breuer-financial-fraud-has-not-gone-unpunished. Consistent with this sentiment, Attorney
General Eric Holder has testified:
[W]hen we are hit with indications that if you do prosecute, if you do bring a criminal charge it
will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps world economy .. . that is a
function of the fact that some of these institutions have become too large.... [I]t has an
inhibiting impact on our ability to bring resolutions that I think would be more
appropriate.... [T]hat is something that we-you all .. . need to consider.
Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., I 10th
Cong. (Mar. 6, 2013) (transcript forthcoming) (statement of Attorney General Eric Holder),
available at
http://www.senate.gov/isvp/?comm=judiciary&type=live&filename=judiciary0306l3
(webcast).
33. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An
Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2014); Ramirez, supra
note 5, at 905; DONNA NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 896 (3d ed. 2012)
(describing deferred prosecution agreement for KPMG).
34. Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate
Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 800 (2013) (stating that
after Arthur Andersen's conviction, the Department of Justice has shifted its approach to enforcing
criminal law against corporations). Credit Suisse's recent guilty plea to criminal charges for helping its
clients evade taxes suggests that the Justice Department may be rethinking its stance against charging
large financial institutions with crimes. See Aruna Viswanatha, Douwe Miedema & Karen Freifeld,
Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to U.S. Criminal Charge in Tax Probe, REUTERS, May 19,2014.
35. Donald H. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives "Naked, Homeless and Without
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criminal prosecution of executives who led bailed out firms into
bankruptcy or insolvency. 36
Although increased individual accountability for fraud seems
necessary to restore public confidence in corporations, shifting the
conventional penalty scheme from corporations to individuals is
unlikely to yield the desired results. Practically speaking, many of the
individuals likely to face charges could not pay a comparable level of
penalties, undermining the compensation objective of such penalties.37
Further, those wealthy enough to pay large fines would be less likely to
agree to serve as directors, absent loss-shifting provisions that would
vitiate any deterrent effect. From a theoretical perspective, there is also
reason to doubt that the threat of astronomical penalties can actually
deter fraud.
C. Harsh Penalties Alone Cannot Deter Fraud
Congress's response to mounting corporate scandals conforms to the
teachings of traditional deterrence theory, which holds that to deter an
activity, its expected cost must exceed its expected benefit.38 According
to this theory, in order to increase the law's deterrent effect, public
officials must either increase penalties for fraud or increase the
likelihood of detection.39  With the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress took
action along both of these fronts. The 2008 financial crisis shows that
such efforts, though well-intentioned, failed to prevent further instances
of devastating fraud.
This result is not surprising in light of existing research on why
individuals comply with the law. Such research shows that most people
comply with the law, not because they fear detection or punishment, but
because they believe it is the right thing to do. Most people obey the
Wheels": Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual
Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 627, 655 (2007); Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-
Enforcement: Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J.
321, 371 (2007) (arguing for individual asset forfeiture in corporate fraud cases); MacDonald, supra
note 2, at 445-46.
36. Ramirez, supra note 5, at 870 (the failure to prosecute financial crisis frauds sends a message
that "crime does pay"); Taibbi, Wall Street Jail, supra note 14.
37. Congress formally recognized investor compensation as an SEC enforcement objective with
Sarbanes-Oxley § 308-the Fair Fund provision. This provision gives the SEC authority to establish an
investor compensation fund to distribute any penalties it collects from securities violators to investors
harmed by their fraud. See Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded
Investors?, 63 Bus. LAW. 317, 318-20 (2008).
38. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 639, 651-53 (1996) (stating the standard formulation).
39. See Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrent
Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 671, 675-76 (2002).
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law mainly because they have internalized its underlying values instilled
from childhood through family and schooling. 40 Society relies on this
internalized moral sense to motivate corporate officials to manage
corporations responsibly and to refrain from self-enrichment through
self-dealing and fraud. Yet the internalization of proper moral values
can be undermined if the law is not enforced or if the punishment for
breaking the law is perceived to be unfair.41
In addition, psychological and criminal law research suggests that
threats of harsh punishment do not provide the disciplinary effect that
deterrence theory posits. 4 2 According to psychologists, the best way to
encourage the internalization of proper values is through modest
rewards and sanctions that promote the desired behavior.43  As these
psychologists explain, when a mild reward or threat induces desired
behavior, the reward or threat alone is insufficient to create an
independent justification for the conduct. Individuals thus persuade
themselves that they followed the conduct rule because they believed it
was the right thing to do. In contrast, when authorities rely on severe
threats to control behavior, individuals may comply with the authorities'
directives when authority figures are present, or if they reasonably fear
detection. In the absence of constant monitoring, however, rules backed
by severe threats are unlikely to be consistently obeyed.44
D. The Bar as a Proportionate Penalty
Increasing public frustration with the ineffectiveness of traditional
approaches to fighting fraud suggests the need for a more creative
approach to remedies-an approach that holds individuals accountable
for their failures without wreaking the devastating personal
consequences of astronomical fines or prison terms, which tend to
undermine the perceived legitimacy of law. The strategic use of the
40. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64-66 (1990). To illustrate, imagine you
have just entered a small store to pick up a few grocery items. Save for you, the store is empty, and a
sign at the counter reads, "Be right back." You glance around impatiently for any sign of the cashier.
You're in a hurry. What do you do? Option (a), walk off with our goods without paying for them;
option (b), leave an appropriate amount of cash on the counter and take your goods; or option (c), leave
empty-handed and go shop at another store. If you chose to follow option (b) or (c), what explains your
choice? The reason could not be fear of punishment or peer disapproval, because your thievery would
never be discovered. In such circumstances, the only reason not to steal would be your own internalized
sense of right and wrong.
41. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility ofDesert, 91 Nw. L REv. 453, 490-93
(1997).
42. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO L.J. 949, 985-89 (2003).
43. See Jones, supra note 7, at 150-51 (reviewing psychology literature).
44. See id.
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power to bar directors and senior executives from further service in
those roles could help the SEC overcome many of the difficulties it has
encountered in seeking to deter large financial firms from committing
serial fraud.45
The officer and director bar has the potential to act as both a
corrective and deterrent device.46 If sought more widely, the bar could
operate both to prevent future misconduct by incompetent directors and
reinforce societal assessments of director responsibility. For these
reasons, the SEC and the courts should look to the bar more frequently
as a remedy for fraud.
III. THE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR BAR
A. History
Before explaining why expanded use of the officer and director bar is
an appropriate response to the fraud and mismanagement that has
characterized the past decade, this Part reviews the law and practice
surrounding the SEC's authority in this realm. Congress first granted
the SEC's formal authority to seek bar orders when it enacted the
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990
(Remedies Act).47 The Remedies Act added provisions to the Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) permitting the SEC to seek orders in federal court
barring an individual who has violated the securities laws' antifraud
provisions from serving as an officer or director of a public company "if
the person's conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve."
Before the Remedies Act, the SEC had obtained bars as part of its
traditional injunctive remedies. Although most of these bars were
obtained in consent decrees, courts recognized the remedy was available
under the courts' general equitable powers.49
45. As Michelle Welsh and I have described in prior work, in Australia, the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (ASIC) has the power to bring actions against directors for breach of their
disclosure obligations and for breach of the statutory duty of care. ASIC has successfully pursued
claims against directors (including outside directors) and obtained bars in several high profile cases. See
Jones & Welsh, supra note 15, at 381-86.
46. Aguilar, supra note 14 ("In terms of general deterrence the officer and director bar is one of
the most effective enforcement mechanisms at the SEC's disposal.").
47. PL 101-429, Oct. 15, 1990, 104 Stat 921 (codified at 15 USCA § 77b-I and 15 USCA
§ 78(u)).
48. The Remedies Act added Section 21d(2) to the 1934 Act and Section 20(e) to the 1933 Act.
49. SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520, 521 (2d Cir. 1994); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d
1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks 20th Annual Federal
Securities Institute (Feb. 15, 2002) (stating that before 1990 the SEC had used courts' equitable powers
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After Congress passed the Remedies Act, federal courts began to
push back against the SEC's efforts to obtain bar orders.5 0 Judges began
to apply a six-factor test when considering SEC bar petitions. 5 1 The six-
factor test, proposed by Professor Jayne Barnard, asks courts to weigh:
(1) the egregiousness of the defendant's violation; (2) the defendant's
"repeat offender" status; (3) the defendant's role or position when he
engaged in fraud; (4) the defendant's degree of scienter; (5) the
defendant's economic stake in the violation; and (6) the likelihood the
misconduct will recur.52
The District Court of New York first applied the six-factor test in
SEC v. Shah, an unreported case that declined to impose a lifetime bar
against a pharmaceutical executive who had bribed FDA officials and
traded stock based on his knowledge of his company's illegal
activities. In weighing the six factors, the court found that the
defendant: had avoided relatively small losses through his trades, had
not been involved in prior violations of the securities laws, and had not
engaged in "clandestine trading such as tipping, purchasing stock in the
names of other people, or trading in a secret account," factors which "do
not suggest a very high degree of scienter."54 The court concluded that
since the defendant had no record of prior violations and had already
been "severely punished," the likelihood of future misconduct was
"relatively slight."55 Thus, although the defendant was an officer of the
subsidiary of the company whose stock he traded, and had received the
entire economic benefit of his trades, the court concluded that the SEC
had not shown that the defendant was "substantially unfit" to serve as a
director or officer of a public company.5 6
In a related case, SEC v. Patel, the defendant appealed a district court
order imposing a lifetime bar.57 Patel was an executive of Par
Pharmaceuticals Inc., the parent company of the firm involved in Shah.ss
The Patel court endorsed the six-factor test, while stating that these were
to obtain bars against "approximately 100 individuals" mostly through consent decrees).
50. Philip F.S. Berg, Note, Unfit To Serve: Permanently Barring People from Serving as Officers
and Directors of Publicly Traded Companies After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1871,
1877-78 (2003).
51. See SEC v. Shah, No. 92 CIV. 1952 (RPP), 1993 WL 288285, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28,
1993).
52. Id. (reciting the six factors); see also Jayne W. Barnard, When Is a Corporate Executive
"Substantially Unfit to Serve"?, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1489, 1510-20 (1992).
53. Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 288285 at *1.
54. Id. at *7.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995).
58. Id. at 138.
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not exclusive factors to be considered.59 While acknowledging that
courts have broad discretion when imposing bars, the Second Circuit
took issue with the district court's permanent bar order. It overturned
the order, because the district court had not considered whether a bar
limited in time or scope might serve as a sufficient remedy. 60 The case
was thus remanded for the district court to explicitly consider whether a
limited bar was appropriate.6 1
Whether or not one agrees with the end results in Shah and Patel, the
cases show that the six-factor test offers little practical guidance as to
when a bar should be imposed.62 The Patel test does not inform courts
or the SEC which of the six factors are most important or how many
factors must be satisfied to justify a bar. Nor does the test provide much
guidance as to what constitutes "egregiousness" or a "high degree of
scienter" and what kind of evidence would show a likelihood of future
misconduct.6 3 The test also fails to delineate those situations in which a
time-limited bar may be more appropriate than a permanent bar.64  For
example, courts somewhat formalistically assert that future misconduct
is unlikely where there is no record of prior securities offenses. This
reasoning conflates two of the factors in the six-factor test, making the
sixth factor seem superfluous. In the end, most courts applying Patel
simply tick through the six factors and reach whatever determination
they find appropriate.65
After Patel, the SEC continued to face obstacles when seeking bar
orders in federal court. A particularly needling case was SEC v.
Farrell.66  In Farrell, an outside director of a community bank was
59. Id. at 141 (finding the six factors "useful in making the unfitness assessment").
60. Id. at 142 ("[W]e take note of the fact that the governing statute provides that a bar on
service as an officer or director that is based on substantial unfitness may be imposed 'conditionally or
unconditionally' and 'permanently or for such period of time as [the court] shall determine.' We take
these provisions to suggest that, before imposing a permanent bar, the court should consider whether a
conditional bar (e.g., a bar limited to a particular industry) and/or a bar limited in time (e.g., a bar of five
years) might be sufficient, especially where there is no prior history of unfitness.").
61. Id.
62. The truncated test that courts adopted ignores the wisdom proffered in Professor Barnard's
discussion of a discarded seventh factor: the defendant's appreciation of an executive's fiduciary
obligations. Professor Barnard recommended that the court "satisfy itself that a defendant is at least as
worthy of public trust and confidence as corporate executives of other corporations. The defendant
bears the burden of persuasion on this issue." Barnard, supra note 52, at 1521.
63. Professor Barnard offers a far more textured analysis of these issues in her writings. See
Barnard, supra note 52, at 1511; Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 1Ob-5 and the "Unfitness" Question, 47 ARIZ.
L. REV. 9 (2005).
64. Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 Bus.
LAW. 391, 412-13 (2004).
65. See Steven J. Crimmins, Where Are We Going with SEC Officer and Director Bars?, 38
BLOOMBERG/BNA SEC. REG. & L. R. 717 (2006) (courts "apply [Patel's] six factors in a summary
fashion").
66. SEC. v. Farrell, No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367 (W.D.N.Y 1996); Cutler, supra note
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convicted of insider trading for trading and tipping others to inside
information about a pending acquisition of his bank. Although Farrell
pled guilty, the district court concluded that a permanent bar order was
not appropriate.67 The court found that "Farrell's securities violations
were serious and he did engage in fraudulent conduct in the hopes that
his illegal activities would not be discovered. However, upon release
from prison, he should not be barred from holding any other officer or
director positions."68  Instead, the court reasoned that because Farrell
was "a talented executive and a permanent bar would effectively prevent
him from using those talents to rebuild his life," he should be
permanently barred only "from holding an officer/director position with
any banking or financial institutions." 69
B. Enhanced SEC Authority
The SEC bristled at its occasional failure to obtain bar orders when
challenged in federal court.70 Its leaders began to argue that, as applied,
the six-factor test was unreasonably demanding.7 1  In particular, SEC
officials objected to courts' demand that the agency prove a likelihood
of re-offending, a factor courts viewed skeptically in the absence of
prior offenses. 2 In a display of frustration with the federal courts'
approach, Enforcement Director Stephen Cutler declared, "when it
comes to O&D bars, the courts have simply lost their way."73
After Enron and WorldCom, the SEC sought enhanced authority to
impose officer and director bars. The agency got its wish when
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley
strengthened the SEC's hand in two important ways. First, Congress
lowered the standard for imposing a bar from "substantial unfitness" to
"unfitness."75 Second, Congress granted the SEC power to impose bars
in administrative proceedings as well as in federal court based on the
49.
67. Farrell, 1996 WL 788367 at *8.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. According to Barnard, courts had flatly rejected the SEC's bar petitions in only two reported
cases. In several other cases, courts imposed a lesser sanction than the SEC sought. Barnard, supra
note 64, at 396-97.
71. Cutler, supra note 49 (asserting that the "substantial unfitness" requirement had "spawned a
burdensome and overly restrictive test for imposing officer and director bars").
72. Id. (criticizing the courts' holding in SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995)).
73. Id.
74. Berg, supra note 50, at 1899.
75. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 107 P. L. 204 § 305, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at Exchange Act
§ 21 (d)(2)(f); Securities Act § 20(e); 15 USC § 7243).
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same "unfitness" standard.7 6  Curiously, in the time since Sarbanes-
Oxley, the agency has not made much use of the new powers it so
vigorously pursued.
The SEC lobbied hard for power to impose officer and director bars
in administrative proceedings without the need to file charges in federal
court. Although Congress balked at this request in 1990, it acceded in
2002 when it adopted Sarbanes-Oxley.7 7  It is therefore surprising that
since that time, the SEC has rarely used its administrative authority to
impose bars.78 A possible explanation is that the kinds of cases in which
the SEC seeks bars are usually serious enough that the agency wants to
make use of the full panoply of the federal court's injunctive powers. 79
The new "unfitness" standard for which the SEC lobbied has also
failed to yield significantly different on-the-ground results.
Commentators agree that Congress intended to ease the SEC's burden
when it changed the standard for imposing bars from "substantial
unfitness" to "unfitness."80  Yet, federal courts continue to apply the
onerous six-factor Patel test, developed under the "substantially unfit"
standard, which Congress has since rejected. 1 Practically speaking,
therefore, the SEC remains in the same position with respect to officer
and director bars that it occupied prior to 2002.
C. The SEC's Approach to Bars in the Post-Crisis Era
More important from the standpoint of this Article, the SEC remains
reluctant to use the bar to address director oversight failures.82 In fact,
the SEC rarely seeks bars against directors, requesting the remedy only
in the most egregious cases. In two recent cases in which the SEC
sought bars, the directors had ignored multiple employee warnings,
76. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 107 P. L. 204 § 1105, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at Exchange Act
§ 21(c)(3); Securities Act §§ 8A(f) and 20(e); 15 USC § 78u-3).
77. See Barnard, supra note 64, at 395-96 (recounting history).
78. See Crimmins, supra note 65; BRIAN A. OCHS ET AL., Sanctions and Collateral
Consequences, in THE SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 181,230 (Richard M. Phillips ed., 2d. ed. 2007).
79. See Crimmins, supra note 65.
80. Id.
81. SEC v. Johnson, No. 04-4114, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 8230, at *11-12 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2006)
(applying Patel factors); see also Crimmins, supra note 65 (stating that the change from "substantial
unfitness" to unfitness has been largely ignored by the courts, which continue to look to the Patel six-
factor test); Jon Carlson, Securities Fraud, Officer and Director Bars, and the "Unfitness" Inquiry After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN. L. 679, 697 (2009) (courts still erroneously assert the
standard for a bar is "substantial unfitness"). Some courts have applied a new nine-factor test that
Professor Barnard proposed after Sarbanes-Oxley. See Barnard, supra note 63, at 46 (outlining
proposed new framework); SEC v. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 121, 145-46 (D.D.C. 2007) (applying
proposed framework). Still, in SEC v. Bankosky, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the validity of the Patel
factors despite the new statutory language. SEC v. Bankosky, No. 12-2943-cv (2d Cir. May 14, 2013).
82. Jones & Welsh, supra note 15, at 396.
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auditor and law firm resignations, and allowed executives suspected of
misconduct to retain their positions and thus continue their fraud.
Statements from recent SEC Enforcement Directors confirm the view
that the officer and director bar is reserved only for the most blatant
cases of director malfeasance. Linda Chatman Thomsen, who served as
Enforcement Director from 2005 to 2009, observed in a 2008 speech to
corporate directors, "the Commission rarely sues directors solely in their
capacity as directors." 84  In fact, she reported that during a three-year
period, the SEC "brought more than 1,800 enforcement actions
involving more than 3,000 defendants," but had "sued less than a dozen
outside directors."85  Her successor, Robert Khuzami, similarly
pronounced, "we will not second-guess the good-faith efforts of
directors," when explaining the agency's decision to charge directors of
a small public company who had "turned a blind eye to warning signs of
fraud.",8 True to Khuzami's assurances, only one bar has been imposed
against a top executive of a large financial institution whose fraudulent
activities contributed to the financial crisis, and not one nonexecutive
director of a failed financial firm has faced SEC charges.
83. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Military Body Armor Supplier and Former Outside
Directors With Accounting Fraud (Feb. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21867.htm; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former
Executives in Illegal Scheme to Enrich CEO With Perks (Mar. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-39.htm.
84. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Speech, Keeping Up With the Smartest Guys in the Room: Raising the Bar for Corporate
Boards (May 12, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch051208lct.htm.
85. Id.
86. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Military Body Armor Supplier and Former Outside
Directors With Accounting Fraud (Feb. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-52.htm.
87. In 2010, former Countrywide CEO, Angelo Mozilo agreed to pay $67.5 million to settle
SEC claims that he misled investors about Countrywide's financial position. Press Release, SEC,
Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC's Largest-Ever Financial Penalty Against a
Public Company's Senior Executive (Oct. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm. Mozilo also consented to a permanent officer and
director bar. Id. The former COO and CFO of Countrywide paid smaller amounts in penalties and
consented to time-limited bars. None of the defendants admitted liability in the Countrywide settlement.
In February 2011, the Justice Department dropped its criminal investigation of the same Countrywide
executives. See E. Scott Reckard, U.S. Drops Criminal Probe of Former Countrywide Chief Angelo
Mozilo, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011.
In the only other financial crisis case to end with sanctions against executives of a too-big-to-
fail firm, Citigroup CFO Gary Crittenden and Chief Investor Relations Officer Arthur Tidesley agreed
to pay $100,000 and $80,000, respectively, to settle SEC charges, brought in an administrative
proceeding, that they knowingly misled investors about Citigroup's subprime exposure. See Press
Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Mortgage Lending Executives with Securities Fraud (Feb. I1,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-43.htm. The two men settled the claims
without admitting or denying liability and were not subject to bar orders. Id. The SEC also charged the
CEO of a less prominent firm, IndyMac, and several other senior executives with securities fraud.
IndyMac CEO Michael Perry settled the claim by agreeing to pay $80,000 without admitting or denying
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IV. THE DETERRENT CAPACITY OF THE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR BAR
A. Advantages over Monetary Sanctions
Despite the SEC's current hands-off approach to high-level
executives and directors, experienced securities lawyers observe that the
officer and director bar is the most feared securities law remedy
available. Commissioner Luis Aguilar recently stated, "During my four
years as a Commissioner, I've noticed how hard defendants fight to
avoid officer and director bars. It is one of the sanctions that they fear
most, which is what precisely makes it one of the most effective
sanctions available."88  Former SEC Director of Corporate Finance,
Alan Beller, made similar comments in 2010 on a panel at the Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. 89
Considering the deterrent potential of the officer and director bar, one
wonders why the SEC remains reluctant to pursue the remedy against
executives and directors of large firms. The enforcement chiefs'
apparent "laying down of arms" is especially befuddling. Taking the
"most feared" remedy off the table before the SEC even opens a case
seems to be a strategic mistake. A better approach would be to ensure
that all directors and executives are aware of the possibility of a bar for
securities violations while exercising discretion to seek the remedy only
in appropriate circumstances.90
As a remedy, the bar on future service offers several advantages over
monetary penalties, especially as applied to independent directors, who
generally have a more tangential connection to the fraud. First, and
most importantly, the bar is preventative. It can keep a fraudster or
incompetent director from serving in such capacity in the future, thereby
protecting investors from future harm.91 Second, the bar underscores the
social message embedded in Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank
regarding the importance of directors' oversight duties.
In addition, the bar skirts the most common objections to imposing
monetary liability on independent directors. As a penalty, the bar is less
liability. Despite the SEC's initial intention to pursue the remedy, Perry did not consent to an officer
and director bar.
88. Aguilar, supra note 14.
89. See Lisa Fairfax, The Bar on Director and Officer Bars, THE CONGLOMERATE (Jan. 12,
2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/01/the-bar-on-director-and-officer-bars.html (reporting on
discussion at the AALS Annual Meeting in January 2010).
90. Professor Barnard has offered insightful commentary on when it is appropriate to impose a
bar. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 49; Barnard, supra note 64. Although courts have adopted many of
Professor Barnard's recommendations, they sometimes unreasonably demand concrete evidence, as
opposed to reasonable conjecture, that a defendant presents a risk of future harm to investors.
91. Johnson, supra note 21, at 523-24.
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severe than astronomical monetary awards and settlements that can be
extracted in shareholder suits and SEC enforcement actions, which
many commentators argue are unfair.92  The bar can be calibrated to
reflect a director's degree of culpability, with time-limited bars imposed
for merely reckless conduct, or when directors express contrition or
cooperate with authorities. 93  Permanent bars, meanwhile, can be
reserved for directors who knowingly participate in, cover up, or benefit
from fraud. Finally, corporate officials cannot avoid the consequences
of a bar through indemnification or insurance.94 Thus, unlike the terms
of a typical SEC settlement,95 the bar requires that individuals account
for their acts or omissions.
B. Who is "Unfit"?
It is difficult to argue in the abstract that the conduct of the directors
of a firm enmeshed in fraud merits the imposition of a bar order. As
noted above, under Patel, imposing a bar requires consideration of six
factors including the egregiousness of the fraud, an individual's role, the
degree of scienter, the financial stake in the fraud, the record of prior
offenses, and the likelihood of re-offending. 96 Assessing such factors is
possible only with the benefit of a full-scale investigation. However,
reviewing the facts of a well-reported case helps to demonstrate how
director oversight failures can sometimes facilitate corporate fraud and
contribute to massive investor losses.
. 1. Enron 1.0
Most readers are familiar with the reports showing that WorldCom
and Enron directors were asleep at the wheel and thus, failed to prevent
their corporations' massive frauds.97 Yet, the details surrounding a less
92. Id. at 532 ("Debarment relief has the advantage of sanctioning misconduct while not
depleting the financial resources of the companies themselves, whose investor and creditor
constituencies may be unaware of and innocent of wrongdoing.").
93. Barnard, supra note 63, at 32-33.
94. Cutler, supra note 49 (acknowledging that "monetary penalties--often paid by D&O
insurance .. . are not always sufficient to achieve the deterrence we seek").
95. See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 2; Buell, supra note 8.
96. See supra, text at notes 50-56.
97. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, Jr., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 22 (Feb. 1, 2002), available at
news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinvO20lO2rptl.pdf (reporting that Enron's Board of Directors
failed in its oversight duties); RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HONORABLE
JED S. RAKOFF ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI, at 22 (Aug. 2003) SK034 ALI-
ABA 761, 787, available at news.findlaw.coml/wp/docs/worldcom/corpgov82603rpt.pdf (finding that
"Among other things, the board of directors of the Company consistently ceded power over the direction
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familiar Enron fraud show starkly how director complicity and passivity
can help set the stage for a devastating corporate collapse. In The
Smartest Guys in the Room, Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind detail
how Enron directors responded to the discovery of accounting
manipulation and embezzlement at the small trading unit, Enron Oil.98
A 1987 report from Enron's auditors revealed glaring problems at Enron
Oil, yet Enron's audit committee abided management's decision to
sweep the matter under the rug.99 Later, when rogue trading at the same
unit nearly plunged Enron into bankruptcy, CEO Ken Lay and the board
of directors feigned shock at the news, and again sought to cover up the
full scope of the misconduct. 00
When Enron finally disclosed the trading shenanigans at Enron Oil,
the SEC opened an investigation, creating an opportunity for
investigators to follow the fraud to the top of the organization. Instead,
the SEC and Justice chose to pursue charges only against the mid-level
managers whom Enron's leaders had misleadingly fingered as rogue
traders.o'0 Years later, a pervasive pattern of accounting manipulation,
irreverence toward the law, and abusive self-dealing had taken hold at
Enron; conduct that was facilitated by Enron directors who
unreasonably took management's implausible explanations of
questionable activities at face value. Had the SEC conducted a more
thorough investigation of Enron Oil, and probed directors' knowledge of
the problems, it could have taken action against Enron's executives and
directors for their role in covering up the fraud. Had regulators taken
firm action at the time, they may even have prevented the Enron
scandal, as we now know it, from occurring.
Under current law, the officer and director bar is available only for
securities violations involving scienter, a state of mind encompassing
intent or recklessness.102  The scienter requirement would likely
complicate efforts to address instances of director inattention, which
of the Company to (CEO) Ebbers ... [who] was allowed nearly imperial reign over the affairs of the
Company, without the board of directors exercising any apparent restraint on his actions"); DICK
THORNBURGH, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, at 7 (June 9, 2003), available at
news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/worldcom/bkexmnr6O9O3rpt2d.pdf (finding that "WorldCom was
dominated by Messrs. Ebbers and Sullivan with virtually no checks or restraints placed on their actions
by the Board of Directors or other Management. Significantly, although many present or former
officers and Directors... had misgivings regarding decisions or actions by Mr. Ebbers... there is no
evidence that these officers and Directors made any attempts to curb, stop or challenge the
conduct . .. they deemed questionable or inappropriate.").
98. BETHANY McLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GuYs IN THE RooM: THE AMAZING
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 17-21 (2004).
99. Id. at 20.
100. Id. at 23.
101. Id. at 24.
102. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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sound more in negligence than fraud. However, the Enron Oil debacle
shows that in some of the most dramatic instances of corporate fraud,
the conduct of senior officers and directors meets the scienter standard.
After all, Ken Lay and Enron's directors knew about the problems at
Enron Oil, including accounting manipulation, sham transactions,
unauthorized trading, and embezzlement. Yet they decided to let the
responsible executives keep their positions and continue their fraudulent
activities and reckless trading. Enron's managers relied on Enron Oil to
deliver paper profits that helped mask the company's true financial
position, and worried little about how such "profits" were concocted.10 3
2. The Financial Crisis Cases
As Professor Lyman Johnson observes with respect to the financial
crisis, "hindsight ... shows that stunningly bad and avoidable decisions
obviously were made in hih places that were bankruptcy inducing for
numerous organizations."' 0 This observation is supported by findings
from special investigators appointed by Congress and the courts to
determine what led the failed financial firms to ruin. 05 Anton Valukas,
the Bankruptcy Examiner who investigated potential claims against
Lehman's directors and officers, concluded that colorable claims existed
against CEO Richard Fuld and several former Lehman CFOs.106
Likewise, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that Citigroup
and other large investment banks "experienced massive losses because
of significant failures of corporate governance including risk
management."' 0 7  The FCIC further concluded that Merrill Lynch,
Citigroup, and Bear Stearns all understated their subprime mortgage
exposures in public statements to investors.' 0 8
Despite ample basis for inquiry revealed by these reports, the SEC did
not pursue action against high-level executives and directors of these
firms.109 In all of the SEC settlements with too-big-to-fail firms,
directors and senior executives have been spared monetary liability and
103. McLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 98, at 20-21.
104. Johnson, supra note 21, at 535.
105. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011)
[hereinafter FCIC Report]; Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), available at http://jenner.com/lehman/.
106. Valukas, supra note 105.
107. FCIC Report, supra note 105, at 279.
108. Id. at 258 (Merrill Lynch), 263 (Citigroup), and 281 (Bear Steams).
109. See Joshua Gallu, SEC Enforcers Said to Weigh Issuing Report on Lehman Abuses,
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 3, 2011 (reporting that the SEC was considering issuing a report in lieu of
bringing charges against Lehman Brothers executives for fraudulent financial reporting); Ramirez, supra
note 5, at 868 (noting that Congressional investigations revealed knowing fraud, and financial firms
have agreed to numerous settlements worth billions of dollars).
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any other form of personal accountability.' 10 For reasons that remain
unclear, the SEC has not vigorously pursued claims against executives
and directors of failed financial firms, leaving it to private litigants to
take on the task.
Although faced with formidable obstacles, in several high profile
cases plaintiffs' claims against directors and executives of these same
firms survived preliminary motions to dismiss."' When these lawsuits
settled, the directors' and officers' liability was covered by insurance.11 2
Still, the private litigants' ability to successfully plead scienter against
the CEOs and senior executives of too-big-to-fail firms suggests the
SEC could also have prevailed had it chosen to pursue claims against
these same individuals."13
C. Toward a New Standard for "Unfitness"
1. The Need for SEC Guidance
For the SEC to fully assert its power to bar officers and directors,
federal courts must show more deference to the SEC's assessment as to
when a bar is appropriate. To encourage such deference, the SEC
should publish guidance on the factors it considers important in seeking
bars. The SEC has unwisely left this discussion to academics and the
courts and has yet to make clear its rationale for pursuing bars. This ad
hoc approach leaves the SEC open to charges of overreaching and using
110. See discussion supra, note 85 and accompanying text.
Ill. See In Re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(denying motion to dismiss and finding strong inference that Dick Fuld and other senior officers acted
with scienter with respect to certain material misstatements by Lehman Brothers); In re Citigroup Inc.
Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying motion to dismiss and finding strong
inference that CEO Prince and other senior officers acted with scienter in concealing the extent
Citigroup's CDO exposure).
112. Memorandum and Order, In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 08 Civ. 5523 (LAK),
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74344 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2012) (No. 1:09-MD-02017) (approving $90 million
settlement of claims against directors and officers with entire payment coming from insurance funds); In
re Citigroup Inc. Securities Litigation, 965 F. Supp. 2d 369 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013). After initially
questioning the fairness of the settlement to which individual defendants failed to contribute, Judge
Sidney Stein approved the settlement on August 1, 2013. See Nate Raymond & Bernard Vaughn, Judge
Approves Citigroup $590 Million Settlement, REUTERS, Aug. 1, 2013.
113. For an insider's perspective on the SEC's decision to avoid action against Wall Street
executives, see Robert Schmidt, SEC Goldman Lawyer Says Agency Too Timid on Wall Street
Misdeeds, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 8, 3014, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-
04-08/sec-goldman-lawyer-says-agency-too-timid-on-wall-street-misdeeds.html (Quoting James
Kidney, a veteran SEC enforcement lawyer, stating that the SEC has become "an agency that polices the
broken windows on the street level and rarely goes to the penthouse floors... . On the rare occasions
when enforcement does go to the penthouse, good manners are paramount. Tough enforcement, risky
enforcement, is subject to extensive negotiation and weakening," and that his superiors "were more
focused on getting high-paying jobs after their government service than on bringing difficult cases.").
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inconsistent criteria to impose bars.
The SEC has addressed the issue of unfitness in inquiries under other
provisions of law that permit the agency to bar professionals such as
securities brokers and investment advisers."14  Similar questions arose
when the SEC fashioned guidelines on how to exercise authority under
Rule 102(e) to bar attorneys and accountants from appearing before it." 5
The SEC should draw on these principles to clearly set forth the
circumstances in which it will pursue bar orders and the rationale it will
use to distinguish between those cases that merit permanent bars and
cases in which time-limited bars are more appropriate."' 6
2. Proposed Considerations
In fashioning such guidance, the SEC must start from the accepted
proposition that imposing a bar requires something more than just a
Section 17(a) or Rule lOb-5 violation."' 7  The SEC should urge courts to
focus the unfitness inquiry on the conduct that is the subject of the
enforcement action and what that conduct reveals about the defendant's
character." 8 After all, it is the defendant's character, not whether he has
been caught before, that tells the most about whether he is likely to re-
offend.1 9 The two factors that seem most relevant for assessing the
propriety of the bar are the egregiousness of the fraud and the
defendant's contrition (or lack thereof).
In evaluating egregiousness, courts should consider the magnitude of
losses attributable to a defendant's conduct, and whether the defendant
114. Barnard, supra note 63, at 24-28.
115. SEC Rules of Practice 102(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e); In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act
Release No. 17597, 47 SEC Docket 471, 478 (Feb. 28, 1981) (holding that the SEC may bar any
attorney who consciously participates in violations of the securities laws from practicing before it).
116. The SEC also could learn from the IRS's experience in addressing attorney involvement in
fraudulent tax shelters. In 2010, in response to rampant tax shelter abuse, the IRS released specific
guidance for attorneys providing opinions on tax shelters. See IRS Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.50
(2013). After clarifying its position, the IRS began to enforce its rules more aggressively. As a result,
tax practitioners now tread carefully before providing legal opinions for tax shelters.
117. See Crimmins, supra note 65.
118. Barnard, supra note 63, at 45-46 (urging a backward-looking inquiry).
119. Criminologists report that it is difficult to predict which securities violators will re-offend.
According to Professor Barnard the recidivism rate for securities fraud is about 25%. Id. at 27-29. In a
recent article, Professor Barnard notes that the personality traits of securities fraud recidivists are similar
to the profile for Antisocial Personality Disorder. Jayne W. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and
Deterrence, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 189, 189 (2008). Recent empirical research also suggests a
correlation between an executive's antisocial conduct outside of work and his company's accounting
fraud. See Robert Davidson et al., Executives' Off the Job Behavior, Corporate Culture and Financial
Reporting Risk, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18001, 2012, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2096226,
www.nber.org/papers/wl8001.pdfnew window-1. Such research suggests that a psychological
evaluation might assist the SEC and courts in determining when a permanent bar order is warranted.
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acted as a ringleader or was a reluctant participant in the fraud. In
oversight cases, courts should consider how long the fraud continued
without the defendant's intervention and the overtness of any red flags
ignored. In considering the defendant's contrition, courts should assess
whether the defendant acknowledges her mistakes, accepts
responsibility, and indicates a willingness to change. As Professor
Barnard wisely counseled in her first article on the subject, the
defendant should have the burden of persuading the court that despite
her fraud, she can be trusted once again in a fiduciary position at a
public company.120
An alternative inquiry would borrow from banking law's approach to
officer and director bars.121 Under federal banking laws, regulators have
the power to bar officers, directors, or other individuals from working at
depository institutions.122 To impose a bar, regulators must show: (1) a
violation of law, safety and soundness standards, or breach of fiduciary
duty; (2) the violation or breach has the effect of causing substantial
financial harm, prejudicing the interests of depositors, or benefiting the
party; and (3) the violation or breach involves personal dishonesty or a
willful or continuing disregard for the safety and soundness of the
institution.123 In addition, under current FDIC rules, the FDIC can claw-
back compensation from any person "substantially responsible for the
failed condition" if they "[f]ailed to conduct [their] responsibilities with
the degree of skill and care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances," and their failure
to exercise care "caused a loss that materially contributed to the failure
of the company." 24  Because the banking law approach arguably
involves federal regulators in the enforcement of state-based duties,
Congress may need to expand the scope of the SEC's enforcement
powers for the agency to adopt similar standards.
To earn the deference it seeks from courts, the SEC may also have to
ease up on the throttle. Several commentators have expressed the view
that permanent bars should be the exception rather than the rule.125 The
120. See Barnard, supra note 52, at 1521-22.
121. See Barnard, supra note 63, at 22-23 (reviewing standards). Lyman Johnson similarly
suggested that bankruptcy courts borrow from the FDIC's standards for barring individuals from
leadership positions at banks. Johnson, supra note 21, at 536.
122. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (2012).
123. See id; Brickner v. FDIC, 747 F.2d 1198, 1203 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984); Magee v. Greenspan,
808 F. Supp. 847, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1991); In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 929-30 (3rd Cir. 1994). For
further discussion see CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs 659 (4th
ed. 2009).
124. 12 C.F.R. § 380.7(b)(1)(i) (2013).
125. Barnard, supra note 63, at 32 (recommending a sanctioning hierarchy in which a permanent
bar would be imposed only in the "most egregious cases"); Johnson, supra note 21, at 538 ("[O]nly in
rare and extraordinary circumstances should the bar be permanent. More typically it would last from
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bar is most appropriate when a defendant uses his or her corporate
position to defraud investors through accounting manipulation,
misleading disclosures, or self-dealing. 12 Yet, a review of the cases in
which the SEC seeks bars suggests it focuses its enforcement power on
executives at smaller firms, as opposed to large companies.12 7
As Professor Barnard notes, the SEC often seeks to bar individuals
who sold unregistered securities, maintained pump-and-dump schemes,
or made quick cash trading in their company's stock.128 Such conduct is
reprehensible, but not nearly as threatening to society as the Enron,
WorldCom, or Lehman-scale frauds. As noted above, in the few
settlements with senior executives charged in financial crisis cases, only
Countrywide executives received permanent or temporary bars. 29 More
troubling, none of the directors of bailed-out or failed too-big-to-fail
firms have faced federal charges for securities fraud or related
misconduct.
D. Anticipated Objections
Corporate and securities law commentators have largely overlooked
the bar as a potentially ameliorative remedy.130  Despite the limited
commentary, it is not difficult to anticipate the kinds of objections that
might arise should the SEC pursue this course. Criticism would likely
proceed along the following lines:
1. The Bar is Too Harsh, Unfair, and Would Deter Board Service
Some federal judges who have denied SEC bar petitions have asserted
that the remedy is too draconian, because it could potentially deprive the
defendant of his or her future livelihood.13 1 This concern is overstated.
For most directors, a directorship is not a full time job, which means a
one to five years.").
126. Barnard, supra note 63, at 47.
127. Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUs. LAw. 679 (2012) (finding individual defendants from large firms fared better
in SEC proceedings than defendants from smaller firms and were less likely to face an industry bar).
128. Barnard, supra note 63, at 18 (describing cases and suggesting that such decisions make little
sense).
129. See supra note 87.
130. In addition to Professor Barnard's excellent articles, Professors Donald Langevoort and
Regina Burch have written on the prospective use of the bar. See Langevoort, supra note 38, at 661-62
(advocating that bar orders be available in private securities litigation); Regina F. Burch, "Unfit To
Serve " Post-Enron, 45 VAL. U. L. REv. 1081 (2008). Several informative student notes have also been
published on this subject. See Carlson, supra note 81; Berg, supra note 50.
131. See e.g., SEC v. Farrell, No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367 (W.D.N.Y 1996); Cutler,
supra note 49.
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bar would not deprive a director defendant of his principal source of
income. Furthermore, the bar on serving as an officer applies only to
executive level positions, where the person serves in a policy-making
role. 132 Thus, although a bar would keep defendants from occupying
fiduciary positions, they would still be permitted to work for public
corporations in nonexecutive roles. In addition, defendants are free to
pursue self-employment or work in high-level positions at privately-held
firms.133
The Martha Stewart case provides one example of how the bar can
protect investors and discipline untrustworthy fiduciaries without
depriving a defendant of her future livelihood. In 2002, Stewart, the
founder, controlling shareholder and CEO of Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia (MSO), was caught up in controversy related to her trading
in another company's stock. During the investigation, Stewart misled
federal officials about the true reasons for her trades. Stewart was
charged and convicted on four counts of obstructing justice and lying to
federal investigators and sentenced to five months in prison.' 34
Despite her legal troubles, Stewart remained employed with MSO.
Upon her indictment, she assumed the nonexecutive position, "Founder"
of MSO.135  Stewart later consented to a 5-year bar order to settle the
SEC's insider trading charges.' 36 After her release from prison in 2010,
while still subject to a bar order, Stewart became Chief Editorial, Media
and Content Officer of MSO. When the 5-year bar lapsed, Stewart
rejoined MSO's board.137 As the founder and controlling shareholder of
MSO, Stewart does not represent the typical barred defendant.
Nonetheless, her experience demonstrates that an individual can
maintain employment at a public company while subject to a bar order.
2. Rehabilitation/Redemption
Much of the difficulty the SEC has faced when seeking bars involves
its efforts to obtain permanent bar orders. One objection to permanent
bars is that they do not allow for the possibility of rehabilitation or
132. Crimmins, supra note 65; Exchange Act Rule 16a-l(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(f) (2013).
133. Carlson, supra note 81, at 687.
134. Constance L. Hays, Martha Stewart's Sentence: The Overview; 5 months in Jail, and Stewart
Vows, Il be Back', N.Y. TIMES , July 17, 2004, at Al.
135. MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA INC., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY
STATEMENT (2012) [hereinafter MSO Proxy Statement], available at phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtmlc=96022&p=irol-sec.
136. Press Release, SEC, Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic Settle SEC's Insider Trading
Charges (Aug. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-134.htm.
137. MSO Proxy Statement, supra note 135.
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redemption.' 38  For that reason, Professor Barnard and others maintain
that permanent bar orders should be limited to true recidivists or those
whose fraud leads to catastrophic losses. The answer to this concern is
not to abandon bars but to pursue them more judiciously. The SEC
should seek time-limited bars as a matter of course and reserve requests
for permanent bars for the most serious violations. The risk of facing a
time-limited bar and the attendant reputational harm should serve as a
sufficient deterrent to fraud, and when imposed, such bars send a strong
message about society's disapproval of the defendant's conduct.139
3. Insisting on Bars Would Make Settlements Impossible
SEC officials would likely argue that insisting on bars as a settlement
condition will make it more difficult for the agency to settle cases
efficiently. This is, of course, the principal justification the agency
offers to defend its policy of allowing defendants to settle without
admitting or denying liability.140 Undoubtedly this is true. Securities
lawyers emphasize that most defendants strongly resist the bar order.
But this only suggests that the SEC may be driving too soft a bargain in
its settlement negotiations.141 When corporate defendants eagerly
accede to settlement terms, an enforcement action becomes akin to a
speeding ticket. Most drivers readily pay such fines to preserve their
driving privileges.
More importantly, the SEC is capable of settling cases even when it
cannot reach agreement regarding the appropriateness of the bar. A
recent practice has developed in which the parties submit a consent
decree containing all of the settlement terms but litigate the issue of the
bar in federal court.142 In some of these actions, the courts reject the bar
petition. 143 Frequently, however, courts grant the relief requested.144
138. Barnard, supra note 64, at 414-16 (lifetime bars are punitive in nature).
139. Id. at 538.
140. See Buell, supra note 8, at 517; MacDonald, supra note 2. The new SEC Chair, Mary Jo
White, has announced that she has reconsidered the "no admit-deny" policy. In the future the SEC will
require admissions in certain cases where it deems such admissions to be appropriate. See James B.
Stewart, S.E. C. Has a Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2013, at
Bl.
141. NAGY ET AL., supra note 33, at 705 (stating that defendants want to settle, not litigate, SEC
enforcement actions).
142. See, e.g., SEC v. Ishopnomarkup.com, No. 04 CV 4057 (DRH)(ARL), 2012 WL 716928, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (reviewing SEC motion for officer and director bar in case where other terms of
consent judgment were agreed to by the parties); SEC v. Dunn, No. 2:09-CV-2213 JCM (VCF), 2012
WL 3096646, at *1 (D. Nev. 2012) ("The parties have settled all matters in this case except for the
SEC's demand for a permanent officer and director bar against defendant.").
143. See, e.g., SEC v. Schroeder, 2010 WL 4789941 (N.D. Cal, Nov. 17, 2010) (denying SEC
motion for a bar order); Competitive Technologies, D. Conn. 3:04-cv-1331 (Oct. 31, 2007) (denying
SEC request for a bar order).
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4. Federalism Concerns
A final reservation about the increased use of bar orders may be the
potential SEC incursion into a traditional state law domain. According
to conventional conceptions, federal securities laws are meant to address
disclosure issues, while state law governs officer and director conduct
standards. Utilizing the bar to discipline corporate officers and directors
would, therefore, enmesh the SEC more deeply in corporate governance
matters. Such concerns seem grounded in an outdated understanding of
the division between state and federal authority in corporate law matters.
Since the Exchange Act was adopted in 1934, the SEC has enjoyed
authority to regulate areas of corporate governance such as proxy voting
and insider trading.14 5  Over the years, Congress has continued to
expand the SEC role in regulating corporate governance.146  With
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, Congress directly charged directors
of public companies with responsibility for overseeing financial
reporting, executive compensation, and risk management. By
encouraging the SEC to use its authority to enforce these enhanced
oversight duties, this Article simply seeks to ensure a remedy exists
when directors fail to perform the functions Congress has assigned to
them. To the extent these recommendations strain the contours of
existing SEC authority, Congress should take action to formalize the
agency's power in this realm.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article addresses the concerns expressed by many scholars that
the federal securities laws have lost their deterrent effect. It focuses on
an existing remedy in the SEC's toolkit that thus far has received too
little scholarly attention. Broader utilization of officer and director bars
should help motivate senior executives and directors to perform their
duties faithfully. Although some of the strategies recommended in this
Article may require action by Congress, the SEC has the power to
pursue most of the recommendations without awaiting further statutory
or doctrinal reforms.
144. See SEC v. Jasper, 833 F.Supp.2d 915 (July 21, 2010) (ordering a 2-year bar); SEC v.
Selden, 632 F. Supp.2d 91 (D. Mass. June 24, 2009) (ordering 2-year bar).
145. Exchange Act, Sections 14(a), 16.
146. See Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate
Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 879, 887-88 (2006).
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